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A Structural  Equation Model  for Tax Compliance  and Auditing 
ABSTRACT 
In this  paper, we estieate a three equation  sodel for taxpayers' 
reported  incoce  and tax liability  and for the probability  of an  audit.  Our 
work  differs f  roe previous  studies in that  our dependent  variables  in the 
coepliance  equations  are taxpayer  reports rather  than a variable  related to 
auditor estisates  of  noncoepliance  and in that we esticate  a structural 
equation  for audits. 
We find  that audits  stimulate  coepliance  although  the effect  Is not 
large and is not statistically  significant  for all groups.  Audits  are sore 
effective  at inducing accurate  reporting  of subtractions  fro.  incose  than of 
incose.  Reduced—fore  results  suggest that IRS activities  other  than  audits 
have significant  cospliance  effects. 
Results  for the sociodecographic  variables  are Interesting and help  to 
explain sose  seesingly  incongruous  findings  in the literature.  We find 
cospliance  to be  higher, if  anything,  in areas with  less  educated  and older 
taxpayers,  a large proportion  of households  headed  by fesales. and a  costly 
native  born population. 
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Wellesley,  MA 1.  Introduction 
The study of tax compliance  promises  important scientific  and policy 
insights.  Form a scientific  point  of  view,  the reporting  of tax liabilities 
provides  an arena  in  which we can observe the compliance  behavior of most  of 
the adult population..Thls  contrasts  markedly with  economists'  study of most 
criminal  behavior  (e.g.. murder, property  offenses) where  a small, and possible 
aberrant,  portion  of  the population  is at  risk.  At this time of large budget 
deficits,  understanding  compliance  behavior also  offers  the possibility of 
'painlessly reducing  the deficit. 
The potential  richness of the tax arena has not escaped the research 
community  and studies of tax compliance  behavior have  burgeoned  during  the 
1980s.  However,  progress to date  has been  somewhat disappointing.  Researchers 
report seemingly  contradictory results  and research on tax compliance  has not 
advanced  beyond  research on  the deterrence  of  general criminal offenses.  We 
believe  that it  is time to step back,  assess  current research findings,  and try 
other approaches.  A critical approach  to tax compliance  research seems 
particularly  valuable  at this time because  of  the extensive  research  that is 
underway  on this topic. 
in this paper, we  provide an analysis  of a 1969  data  set that  combines 
Information  from the IRS's Statistics  of Income  (SOl) program,  the Census. 
internal  IRS documents  and  a special data  set compiled by the IRS In the mid 
1970s.  This last data  set has been  used  by a number of researchers  in  recent 
empirical  studies of tax compliance. 
in carrying out the analysis,  it Is important to take  into  account a 
number  of Issues  that are central to  compliance  research.  First,  consider the 
dependent  variable  used in previous  empirical  studies, namely  an  estimate of 2 
compliance based on Internal Revenue  Service  (IRS) euditors'  findings.  Given 
the difficulty  of rRs auditors in  detecting  unreported  in  income,  the use of 
such  a dependent  variable  provides results that  are very  difficult  to 
interpret.  Instead we  analyze the actual  reporting decisions  of  taxpayers.  As 
is described  in detail in  Section 4, the use of  these  types of dependent 
variables  offers  a number  of  advantages.  Primarily,  it makes estimation of 
compliance  models  less complex and interpretation  of results more 
straightforward.  Send, we  specify a structural  model  that allows us to  infer 
the factors affecting  taxpayers income reports and reports of  subtractions 
e.g., deductions  and exemptions) on the tax return.  Other compliance  research 
considers  only  a  single compliance  decision.1  We  know,  however, that  the 
probability  of  detection  is  much  higher  for subtractions  than income reports 
and we suspect  that  taxpayer behavior differs  for these two quite  different 
types of compliance  activities.  Noncompliance  from underreports  of income is 
often an act of  omission while noncompliance  from  overstatement  of subtractions 
requires  actual  misstatements.  Third,  the work  reported  here represents  the 
first  time, as far as we are aware,  that empirical  research has specified  and 
estimated  a structural  equation  for audits.  Yet,  theory suggests  that the 
proper  specification  of compliance equations  requires  careful consideration  of 
the audit process. 
Tosummarize our results briefly, we find  that taxpayers  significantly 
underreport  adjusted  gross  income  (AGI) and that  increasing  the probability  of 
audit  increases  repo,,ted  income and tax liability.  We also  find  that audits 
are more  effective  in inducing accurate  reporting  of  subtractions  from  income 
than  of income.  In  addition,  there  is evidence  that  detectability  of 
noncompliance  through audits  is a determinant of taxpayers'  reporting  behavior. 3 
The results  that audits  affect  compliance  are rather comforting  and 
support other findings.  However,  both our results and the results of previous 
studies vary  considerably  across  taxpayer groups  and are not always 
significant.  Previous  studies using different  models  all report  that,  in 
general,  audits  deter  tax noncompliance  but rind  significant  deterrent  effects 
of audits for different  taxpayer groups.  To us this  is  disturbing  and suggests 
that economists understanding  of the effects of  audits on  compliance  is  not 
very  firm.  In the conclusions we suggest reasons why this might be the case. 
Comparison  of our structural  and reduced form  results suggests  that IRS 
enforcement  actions  other  than audits  have  significant  effects on compliance. 
To date research,  including  our own,  has focused on the effect of audits and 
largely ignored  other  IRS actions.  It appears that  enhancing  our understanding 
of the effect  of tax administration  on  compliance  will  require economists  to 
broaden  their  perspectives. 
The results for sociodemographic  variables  are also of interest in that 
they  help to  explain  seemingly  incongruous  results  in  the literature  and to 
provide  important  guidance  for future  research.  We find in general that 
compliance  is higher in  areas with  less educated  and older populations  and in 
which  a large percent  of  the population  is native  born or in  female—headed 
households.  The estimated  coefficients  on  these variables  in  ours and others' 
work depend  critically  though on the dependent  variable  used  and the vector  of 
explanatory  variables  included in  the model.  Consistent  implications  emerge. 
however,  when the coefficients  on  these variables  are interpreted  carefully  on 
the basis  of the model  specified. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section. we present  our 
conceptual  framework.  The two sections  that follow describe the data and our 4 
empirical  model.  Section 5 and 6 contain a discussion  of the eapirical  results 
for our structural  and the reduced  fore equations respectively.  The final 
section contains  our conclusIons. 
2.  Conceptual  Framework 
Our  model  of tax compliance  and enforcement  is a simultaneous  equation 
model with equations  for taxpayers'  reports and for the probability  of an 
audit.  Specifically,  to  reflect the reporting  behavior of taxpayers we include 
equations  for reported  adjusted  gross income (AGI) and the reported  total tax 
liability.  We use separate equations  for reported AGI and tax liability  rather 
than  a single  reporting  equation  because of the differences  in the magnitude 
and possible  causes of income  underreporting  and the overstatement  of 
subtractions  (i.e.  ,adjustments,  exemptions,  deductions  and credits).  The 
results  for the reported AGI equation  allow  us to determine  the factors 
affecting  income  reporting while  comparison  of  the results  for the reported  AIM 
and tax liability  equations  allows us to infer the factors associated  with  the 
overstatement  of  subtractions.2 
To specify the equations  for reported  AGI and total tax liability,  we 
surveyed  the theoretical  literature  on tax compliance.3  This literature 
suggests  that taxpayer's  reports of income and tax liability depend  on the 
enforcement  policies of the tax  authorities,  income, tax rates, and tastes  and 
preferences.  Although not explicitly  mentioned  in the literature,  the 
theoretical  models of tax  compliance  also imply that  taxpayers'  reports of 
Income  and tax liability depend  on provisions  of the tax code  regarding  income 
exclusions  and subtractions. 5 
We chose audits  as the measure of  enforcement  policy  since this is the 
enforcement  action  that has been  of most  interest  in the literature  on  tax 
compliance  and since  the IRS believes  that audits  are its most  effective 
Instrument  for stimulating  accurate taxpayer  reports  (Controller  General of  the 
United  States.  1976, p.1).  To  specify  the audit  equation, we read the 
available  documents  regarding  the way in which  the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) selects  returns for audit4 and discussed  the selection  process with IRS 
personnel  at the national and district  level.  The IRS selects the 
largest proportion  of returns for audit using  carefully  developed  computerized 
formulas, known  as  'èhe DIP formulas.  The parameters  of the DIP formulas are 
estimated  using  data  from  the IRS's Tax Compliance  Measurement  Program  (TCMP). 
Under this program,  the IRS every three or four  years  selects approximately 
50.000  returns  to be examined  by  its best auditors.  Taxpayers  are asked  to 
substantiate  every  line item on their return, and auditors record  both  what  the 
taxpayer  filed  and what  they  believe to be the correct  report.  These data  are 
used  to estimate  equations  that relate  the extent  of underpayment  to the 
characteristics  of the filed return.  In  subsequent  years,  the IRS uses the 
parameters  estimates  from  these equations  to  score  each  return  filed In regard 
to its audit  potential.  The returns with  the highest  scores  are targeted  for 
audit.  The actual  number of  returns audited  through the DIP program depends on 
the reporting  behavior  of  taxpayers,  the type and number  of  audit personnel 
available,  and the amount  of  audit resources  Involved In  special audit 
programs.5 To  reflect  this audit selection  process, we model the probability 
of an  audit  as determined  by  taxpayers  reports which are endogenous  to the 
model, by taxpayer  oöaracteristlcs  that the IRS both  observes  and may legally 
use for audit  selection,  and by  the level of IRS resources. 3.  The Data 
We obtain our data  on reported AG! and total  tax liability  and on  the 
number  of  returns  filed from the Statistics  of Income  (SO!) files  and our 
information  on audits  from  the IRS's ProJect 778 data  base.  Our measures of 
income and tastes and preferences  come from the 1970  Census of Population  and 
Housing,6  Information on IRS audit resources was obtained  from  an IRS internal 
document  (IRS, l969' 
All data  except  that on  IRS work load (returns per full—time-equivalent 
employee)  are aggregated  to  the three  digit zip code level since data on audits 
are not available  at  the individual  level.  Information on IRS work  load  is 
aggregated  to the IRS District Office  level since this  is  the administrative 
unit  responsible  for conducting  audits.  IRS Districts  are coterminous  with 
state boundaries  except  in  the most  populous states  (e.g.. California)  where 
multiple  Districts  are established.  Tax return data  are for 1969 returns filed 
in  1970,  and audit data  relate  to audits  performed  in 1969. 
Information on audits  is  available  for seven  distinct groups  defined on 
the basis of AOl and income  source  (I.e., whether or  not some Income  is 
received  from  a business or farm.)7  The IRS separates  the returns  into these 
audit  classes because  the it believes  that compliance  behavior varies  across 
groups and developa4eeparate  audit selection  tormulas  for each  group. 
Both the IRS and academic  researchers  (Witte and  Woodbury.  1985. and 
Dubin  and Wilde,  1988) have  tested  for the homogeneity of  taxpayer  behavior 
across  the audit  classes and  concluded  that  aggregation  is not appropriate.  We 
therefore  estimate  separate models  for the  different  audit classes.  Since we 
are able to obtain  income  estimates  for only  the five  low (incomes below 
$10,000  in 1969  dollars) and middle  (incomes between $10,000 and $30,000 for 7 
proprietors  and between $10,000 and $50,000 for wage and salary  workers in 1969 
dollars) income  audit  classes, we present results for only these audit classes. 
The definitions  of the audit classes are given  in  Table  1.  There are no good 
estimates  of income  for the two high income groups from  the Census or  other 
sources.8  These  high income returns account for less than  one percent of  the 
returns filed in 1969.  Results for  a  specification  that omits  the income 
variable for these  two audit  classes are available  on request. 
4.  The Empirical  Model 
Our model  Is a three equation  model for reported AGI  (AGI"), reported 
total tax liability  (7").  and the log odds of an  audit  (A).  We  discuss our 
specification  for the two reporting  equations  first and then  turn  our attention 
to the specification  of  the audit equation. 
We see reported AGI and report  total  tax liability  as  determined  by the 
log odds of an audit  (our measure of enforcement  actions which is 
endogenous),9  the degree  to  which noncompliance  can be detected  (D) in an  audit 
(our measure  of the penalties),  the level of income  (I),  a vector of  variables 
that  reflect  important  aspects of  the tax code  regarding  filing  requirements. 
income exclusions  and subtractions  from  income  (TC), and a vector  of 
sociodemographic  variables  that control for differences  in  tastes  and 
preferences  (Sr).  Formally,  our two equations  for taxpayer reports are 
AGI"=a0+a1 A+a2Di-a3 
I +a4TC+a5S"+eg 8 
TZ'  b0  ÷b1A+b2D+b3 
I  4.b4TCb5Sr'  4-es 
where  the e's are random  error  terms and the a's and b's are the paraeters to 
be estimated. 
Our measure of the log odds of an  audit  is  based on the audit coverage 
in the geographical  area.  We do not measure penalties  directly but rather seek 
to  measure  them  indirectly  through our  measures  of  detectability.  The  vast 
majority  of audits  result  in some  change, generally  an  increase,  in tax 
liability.1°  However,  the taxpayer generally receives  no  formal  penalty  but 
rather  is assessed  the taxes due plus interest for the period  of nonpayment.1 
Thus,  for 'ost taxpayers  it is what  the auditor uncovers  that is  the important 
factor  in determining  the costs of  noncompliance.12 
We seek  to  control  for the degree  of detectability  in two ways.  First. 
we estimate  separate equations  for reported AGI and tax liability.  As the IRS 
readily  acknowledges  (e.g., US  Department  of  the Treasury,  1983), it is far 
more  able to  unoover overstatements  of  subtractions  from income than 
understatements  of income.  Thus, we  would expect  audits  to have  a stronger 
effect  on reported  tax liability where overstatements  of  subtractions  as well 
as underreporting  of income are reflected than  on reported  ACt.  Second, we 
include two variables  related  to information  reporting  to the IRS and other 
types of record  keeping.  In  1969, the major paper  trails used by  the IRS were 
the W—2 forms.13  To  reflect  the relative availability  W—2s  we include the 
percent  of employment  in  manufacturing  and in the service industries,  Income 
from  manufacturing  firms is  generally  covered by W—2  reporting  and any 
underreporting  of income  is likely to be detected by an  audit.  In  contrast, 
income  earned  in the  service  industries  is more  likely  to be in  a form (e.g., 9 
cash, comsissions)  less subject to  detection.  Even the proprietor  audit 
classes in areas  where such  employment  is in manufacturing  will be likely to 
have  "paper  trails"  for receipts because of the extensive  record  keeping 
activities  of large manufacturing  enterprises  and because a significant  portion 
of  the income  for individuals In the proprietor  audit  classes is from  wages  and 
salary. 
Our measure  of income  is obtained from  the Census  and varies  according 
to  the income  category  included in  the audit  class.  We chose  Census  Income as 
our measure of "true'  income rather  than  an  estimate of income  from TGMP  audit 
results because TCMP auditors fail to  uncover a substantial  fraction of 
unreported  income.14  We  have not explicitly  introduced  a  measure  of the 
marginal  tax rate  as an  explanatory  variable because  for our data  set the tax 
rate  has no  variation  that is independent of  income.15  The coefficient  on  our 
Income variable  should  therefore  be interpreted as  measuring  the effect of 
changes  in income  on  compliance  when  the tax rates  change with income in 
accordance  with the tax code. 
To reflect relevant  features of  the tax code,  we  include variables  for 
the percent of the population  over 65. average  family size,  the percent of the 
population  owning  their own home, and the percent unemployed.  These  variables 
control  for legitimate  nonfilings  by very low income  Individuals  (i.e.. in 
1969, generally  those with incomes below $600),  the special allowances  for 
senior  citizens,  the exemptions  for dependents,  the tax deductability  of 
mortgage  interest  and  property  taxes,  and the exclusion  of  unemployment 
benefits  from  income.  Some  of these variables  may  also  be related to  tastes 
and preference  regarding  tax compliance.  For instance,  there has been  some 
speculation  that  in  areas with  high unemployment  there might  be more  resentment of the government  and less willingness  to pay the eandated  taxes.  The two 
variables  measuring  employment  structure (the percent of the population 
employed  in manufacturing  and in  services) may serve to  control  for the most 
important adjustment  to income, the adjustment  for employee business  expenses, 
as well as detectability. 
The theoretical  work  on tax compliance provides  relatively  little 
direction  in  selecting  the variables that  should be included to  reflect tastes 
and preferences.  The limited empirical work on  tax compliance  and the survey 
research  do  however,  provide some valuable guidance.  See Witte and Woodbury 
(1983b), Kinsey (l984a). and Jackson and Hilliron  (1986) for surveys.  The 
variables  that  are consistently  related to tax compliance  behavior  Include sex, 
race, education,  age, and place of  birth.  We include measures of each in our 
model. 
Our specification  of  the taxpayer compliance  equations  differs  from 
the literature  in that our dependent variables  are reported AGI and tax 
liability  rather  than  measures derived from tax auditor estimates  of 
noncompliance.  We believe that  using variables related  to the taxpayers' 
reports  offer several  important advantages  for estimating  the compliance model 
and interpreting  the results.  In addition,  the use of  reported AGI and tax 
liability  as the equations  for the taxpayers' behavior  is  implied by much  of 
the theoretical  literature  on  tax compliance  and recommended by the National 
Academy  of Sciences'  Panel  on  Research on Taxpayer  Compliance  (Scholz, Roth 
and Witte,  1988). 
With reported AOl and total tax liability  as the dependent variables  in 
the equations  for taxpayers'  behavior  it is reasonable  to assume  a normal 
distribution  for the error  terms in the equations  and to use standard 11 
techniques  for estimating  the equations.  Further, the error  term can be 
interpreted  as arisingjrom true stochasticness  in taxpayers  behavior  or from 
omitted variables  related to that behavior  (e.g.. knowledge  of the tax  code). 
When the dependent  variable  is affected  by tax auditors'  estimate  of  unreported 
income, these  assumptions  and interpretations  are not valid,  in this case,  the 
error  term  reflects  any elements of the auditors'  and taxpayers'  behaviors  that 
are not captured  by the model.  Further,  the error  term has some  unusual 
features  that make it difficult  to handle  statistically,  particularly  in  a 
simultaneous  equation  setting.  First,  the error  term is not continuously 
distributedts..tnce  taxpayers'  reports  and auditors'  findings  often coincide. 
For example,  with  unreported  income as the dependent  variable  there may be an 
atom  at  zero.  Second,  the density  of the error  term may be  distributed 
asymmetrically  about the atom  since underreports  of  taxable  income are far more 
common than  over  reports.  While  there has recently been  some  very  good 
progress  on  methods  to  handle  these difficulties  (Schmidt.  1986). the issue is 
not resolved. 
The advantages_of  using  reported  income as a dependent  variable. 
rather than  a variable such  as unreported  income which  is determined  in  part by 
tax auditors'  findings, are, perhaps,  even  more important  for the 
interpretation  of the estimated  coefficients.  With reported  Income as the 
dependent  variable,  the effects of explanatory  variables  can arise either  from 
taxpayers'  reporting  behavior or from specific provisions  of the tax code. 
With  a dependent  variable that is Influenced  by  tax auditors'  findings, the 
effects  of  explanatory  variables  might  also reflect the auditors'  behavior. 
Sorting  out,even  the separate  effects of the tax code  and compliance  behavior 
may not be easy,  but at least the tax code is known and thus  one should  be able 12 
to make  some reasonable  interpretation  c-f  the coefficients  for the reported 
income equations.  By  way of contrast, very little is  known about  tax auditors' 
behavior  other  than that they miss  a substantial amount  of  underreporting  and 
that they  are far better  at catching  overstatements  of deductions and 
exemptions  than  at  uncovering  underreports  of income  (U.S, Department  of the 
Treasury.  1983).  This lack of information  compounds  considerably  the task  of 
interpreting  he  coefficients  in an equation  for unreported  income  (or for 
percentage  of noncompliance>  and is one of  the primary reasons that we use 
taxpayer reports  as the  dependent  variables  in  the compliance  equations. 
The third  equation  in our  mode?  is the equation for the log odds  of an 
audit,  We see the log odds  of an  audit as determined  by  reported ACt and 
reported  total  tax liability which are endogenous  to the model, by a vector of 
variables  that  are observed  by  the IRS and that may be legally used to select 
returns  for audit (sa) end by the level of IRS resources  (R).  Formally, 
r  a  a 
AC0'-c1AGI  +c2Tr+c35  +c4R÷e 
where  ea is the random  error and the c's are the parameters  to be  estimated. 
We choose  the log  odds  of an audit  as  the dependent  variable  for the audit 
equation  for two reasons.  First, this  functional  form ensures that the 
probability  of an audit  is between zero  and one for all values of  the 
explanatory  variables,  Second,  the specification  nests the random  audit 
strategy,  assumed  in much  theoretical  work,  as a special case.16  A random 
audit  stratei  would  be implied if only  measures  of IRS resources were 
significantly  related to the log  odds  of an  audit. 
The variables  that are available  from  the filed tax return  and that  the 
IRS may potentially  use for audit selection  are the measures  of  employment 
structure,  the unemp1onnt  rate, the percent of the population  over 65, 13 
average  family  size and the percent of the population  who own their own homes. 
Our Measure of IRS resources  is the number  of  returns per full-time-equivalent 
district  employees 
Although  all federal  tax returns  in  any audit  class are scored by  the 
same  DIP formula for  audit  potential,  the chances of a tax return  being 
audited,  ceteris  paribus, differ  considerably  across  IRS districts.  The reason 
for the differences  In  rules across  districts  Is related  to  resource 
availability.  Based q  the DIP scores,  the IRS develops a master  plan  annually 
for the number  of return  examinations  to be  conducted  by audit  class  in  each 
district.  However, the IRS has not been  able to locate  its staff in a fashion 
to carry  out its plan.  In some  regions  it has been  able  to  examine 
substantially  fewer returns than  indicated  by the optimal base  plan  whereas  In 
other regions  more  audits were  conducted.  Since  much  of  the reason  for the 
differences  in  the probability  that  tax returns are selected for audit, 
ceteris  paribus,  is  related to  resource  constraints,  we  use a measure  of IRS 
audit resources  to control for differences  in  the audit rules across  taxpayers. 
Note that  It is  the variation  In  the completion  of  the optimal plan 
across  districts  that is  the important  In this  respect rather  than  just  the 
difference  in  resources across  regions.  A difference  in resources  relative to 
the number  of returns is not by itself necessarily  evidence  that the audit 
selection  rule  varies  across  taxpayers.  it the IRS targets  its resources 
towards  areas  that are believed to be particularly  noncompllant,  then higher 
than  average  resources  might just  reflect  higher  concentration  of  noncompliant 
taxpayers.  There  is considerable  evidence  in  government  reports  (GAO, 1976 and 
WIlt,  1986)  that the IRS has not been  able  to  distribute  Its resources  among 
districts  in away to achieve  best its revenue  and compliance  goals given its 14 
budget.  In addition.  Long  (1985) concludes  that the "introduction of TCMP 
compliance  data  did not bring  about any dramatic  restructuring  in  audit 
coverage——even  when It disclosed  regions or  return  classes with  much lower 
compliance  levels  which  were  receiving  less audit attention than  more  compliant 
groups  (p. 29)," 
We achieve identification  of  our model  by  use of  exclusion  restrictions 
which  are justified  on  the basis  of  institutional,  legal and informational 
constraints.  Specifically,  we identify the two reporting  equations  by 
excluding  our  measure of  IRS resources from  these equations.  The level of IRS 
resources  affects reporting  behavior only indirectly through its effect on the 
likelihood  that a taxpayer is  audited.  Identification  of the audit equation  is 
obtained  by the exclusion  of  economic  and socio—demographic  variables  that  are 
not available  to the IRS on  the tax return or information  documents  (e.g., 
whether  or not an individual was foreign born) or, if  available,  cannot  legally 
be used  to select  returns for audit  (e.g. sex). 
We estimate  the model by  two stage least squares.  We use a single 
equation  method  rather  than  a systems method  of  estimation  (e.g., three  stage 
least squares)  because  we believe that  some  of our equations  (e.g.,  the 
equation  for reported  AG!) are  more completely  specified  than others  (e.g. the 
audit  equation)  and  we are concerned  about spreading  any  omitted variable  bias 
across  equations.  (See Intriligator  (1978) for a discussion.) 
5.  EmpIrical  Results  for the Structural  Model 
Tables  2 thru  4 contain the results of the two—stage  least squares 
estimation  for the reported AG! and tax liability  and for the log odds of an 
audit  equations  respectively.  Note first that  the model  explains a significant 15 
proportion  of the variation  in  reported AGI and tax liability and in the log 
odds  of an audit  for each  of  the five audit classes.  As we had  anticipated,  we 
Model  reporting  behavior sore successfully  than  auditing  behavior.  For 
reported  AOl,  the R2s range froa  .14 for low incoce wage  and salary workers 
with iteMized  deductions  to .79 for low incoae proprietors  while  for tax 
liability  tha range of  the R2s is froM .13 for Middle  incoie  wage and salary 
workers  to .79 for low Incoce proprietors.  Our Model explains  between 6 (for 
low incoee  wage and salary workers with iteelzed deductions)  and 31 percent 
(for  low incoMe  proprietors) of the variation  in the log odds  of an  audit. 
As Might  be  expected,  the coefficients  on  income are by  far the most 
significant  of the estimated  coefficients  in both the reported AOl and tax 
liability  equations.  The coefficients  on income in  the reported  AGI equations 
range from .27 for low Income taxpayers  taking  standard deductions  to .97 for 
middle  income  wage and salary  workers.  Taxpayers  in  all audit  classes reported 
significantly  less than  an  additional  dollar  of  AOl for each  extra dollar  of 
income. 
There  are legal exclusions  of certain types  of  income  from taxation  and 
legal adjustments  to  income  that account  for some  differences  between income 
and reported  AGI.  Further,  in 1969,  some individuals  (i.e.  ,those with  total 
income below  $600  unless  they had  net earnings  from  self  employment  above  $400) 
In the low income  groups  (I.e., AGis below $10,000)  were  not required  to  file. 
However,  recall  that we include variables  to  control  for the major income 
exclusions  (the percent over  65 to  control  for the exclusion of  Social Security 
benefits  and the unemployment  rate to control for the exclusion  of  unemployment 
compensation),  adjustments  (the two employment  structure  variables  to  control 
for employee  business  expenses,  the largest adjustment  to  Income  In 1969). and 16 
some of the major causes of extremely  low income  (the unemployment  rate  and the 
percent of the population over  65).  We do not control for some  exclusions 
(e.g.,  income on  municipal  bonds), adjustments  (e.g., contributions  to 
retirement  plans  by  the self employed),  and causes of incomes below  the filing 
level  (e.g., dependent  teenagers).  However,  it  seems unlikely  that  such 
exclusions,  adjustments  (total adjustments were less than .1 percent  of  AGI in 
1969) and legitimate nonfilings  could  explain the low rate  at which income 
shows up in  reported AG!. 
The coefficients on income in  the tax liability  equations provide an 
estimate  of the marginal  tax rate  on  total  income  (income before  exclusions  and 
adjustments  by the tax code).  The marginal  tax rates  implied by  these 
coefficients  do  not seem unreasonable.  For the low income  groups  the estimated 
marginal  rate  is  between 7 and 10  percent.  As expected, middle  income groups 
had higher  marginal  rates  (22 percent for middle  income  proprietors and 27 
percent  for middle  income wage  and salary  workers). 
For all audit  classes,  we find that increasing  the odds  of an  audit 
increases  reported  AG! and tax liability.  However,  for reported  AG! the effect 
is significant  for only  two groups  and for reported  tax liability  it is 
significant  for three groups.  The magnitudes  of the effects of audits  on  tax 
compliance  are modest with  the elasticities  for reported  tax liability with 
respect  to the audit variable  being between  .19 and .31 when  significant. 
These  elasticities  imply that a one percent  increase  in audit  coverage would 
lead to  approximately  a  $1.4  billion  increase in tax revenue in  current dollars 
for the five  audit classes considered.  This is an increase  in 1969 tax revenue 
from these  groups of approximately  .69 percent. 17 
High  audit  rates appear  to be more effective  in  eliciting  accurate 
reporting  of subtractions  from  income than  accurate  reporting  of Income.  The 
elasticity  of reported AOl with respect to the audit variable  is  smaller than 
the elasticity  for reported  tax liability  for all five  audit classes and the 
dIfference  inelasticities  is more  pronounced  for the middle  than  the low income 
audit  classes.  These  findings support  IRS's belief  that  its auditors are 
better  able  to find overreported  subtractions  than  underreported  income.  The 
findings  are also consistent  with survey  findings  (Westat. 1980)  that 
relatively  more of  the noncompliance  for blue—collar  communities  is from 
underreported  income whereas  for white-collar  communities relatively  more  of 
the noncompliance  is from  overstated  subtractions  from income. 
Recall  that we have  no  direct  measure of penalties,  but rather  estimate 
separate  equations  for reported  ACt and tax liability  and include two  measures 
of detectability  (the percent of  employment  in  manufacturing  and in  services) 
as admittedlycrude proxies for penalties.  Our results provide some limited 
support  for greater detectability  being associated  with  compliance. 
Specifically,  the finding that  reported  tax liability  is more responsive  to 
audit  rates  than is reported AOl supports  the hypothesis  that the effectiveness 
of high  audit  rates  in  eliciting honest  reporting  on  the tax return  is related 
to the detectability  of  noncompliance.  It  appears  that much  of the effect  of 
audits  operates  through subtractions  from Income which  must be  substantiated  by 
the taxpayer  rather  than through Income  reporting. 
Also,  we find higher  level of employment  in  manufacturing  (where most 
Income  may be reported  to the IRS by the employer)  to be  associated  with  higher 
levels  of reported  tax liabilities  for all audit classes and higher  levels of 
employment  in services18  (where a substantial  portion of  all income may not be 18 
covered  by  W—2 or other  reports) generally  to be  associated with lower  levels 
of reported  tax liability.  The results are significant, however,  for only  two 
of the low income groups. 
Results  for sociodemographic  variables  are interesting and help  to 
explain  some  seemingly  incongruous  findings  that appear in  the literature.  As 
in  other  studies that  include measures  of both  income and education,  we find 
that,  if anything,  taxpayers  in  areas with a more  educated population  report 
lower AGI and pay less in  taxes.  In  their summary of  the factors related to 
tax compliance,  Jackson and Ki1lton  (1986) suggest that the more  educated may 
be less  compliant  because they  better  understand  the opportunities  for  evasion 
and are more willing to play  the audit lottery than are the less educated. 
Studies  that omit income from the specification  (e.g., Dubin and 
Wilde,  1988)  find  that the educated  are, if  anything, more  compliant  with  the 
tax laws.  Indeed, if  we omit  income  from  our specification,  the coefficients 
on the education  variable becomes positive.  Income and education  are, 
however,  highly  correlated.  With  income  omitted  from the specification,  the 
educationvariable  serves  partially  as an  income  proxy and the estimated 
coefficient  on education must  be interpreted  accordingly. 
The percent  of  the population  that Is nonwhite  is not significantly 
related  to income  reporting behavior  for any  of the groups we consider although 
reported  tax liability  is signiticantly  lower  for nonwhites than for whites in 
two of the low income audit classes.  The findings  for race  in  other  studies 
are mixed.  The results obtained depend  to  some extent  on the dependent 
variable  used and on  whether or n  income  is included as an  explanatory 
variable.  When income  is excluded  from the specification  and an  estimate  of 
the compliance  rate  that  is indirectly  related to  auditors'  findings  is used  as 19 
the dependent  variable  (Witte and Woodbury,  1985, Dubin  and Wilde.  1988),  the 
coefficient  on the variable  for the percent of the population  that is nonwhite 
is  significant  for most  audit  classes and when significant  generally,  but not 
always,  indicates  that whites  are more compliant  than  other racial  groups.  In 
contrast,  our results which  control f  or income and use measures  of  taxpayers' 
reports  as dependent  variables shi  no evidence  that whites  are slgniicantly 
more accurate  in their income  reports and only  weak  evidence  that  whites  are 
significantly  more accurate  in their reports of subtractions  from  income. 
Clearly,  economists'  understanding  of the relationship  between race and 
compliance  is not very strong.  This mirrors the results for this variable  in 
the general  crime  literature.  See Schmidt  and Witte  (1984).  Wilson  and 
Herrnstein  (1985) or Blumstein.  et  al.  (1986) for a discussion. 
The results  for the percent foreign born  and the percent of households 
female  headed  generally  support previous work.  Except  for low—income wage and 
salary  workers,  we find, as do  previous studies,  that  areas with  a relatively 
large percent  of families headed  by females and a relatively  small percent  of 
the population  foreign  born tend to  report higher  AGI and tax liability.  The 
better  compliance  for areas with  a larger  percentage  of families headed by 
women  appears  to result  predominantly  from higher  income reports. 
The variables  related to the taxpayers'  ages  are the percentage  of the 
population  older  than  65 and the  ,verage  age of the population  between 18 and 
65.  The coefficients  on  these  variables may reflect any age or cohort effects 
related  to  compliance.  In  addition,  the variable for the percentage  of  the 
population  over 65 is used  to  control for the exclusion  of Social Security 
benefits  from taxable income  and the extra exemption  allowed  Individuals over 
65.  The coefficients  on  this variable will  be related to both  age and tax code 20 
effects  and would  be negative  if being  over  65  affected  reporting only through 
the special provisions  of the tax  code  for  older  taxpayers. 
As in  other  studies usingjnformatlon  related to 1969 returns 
(Clotfelter,  1983, Witte and Woodbury,  1985. and Dubin and Wilde,  1988).  our 
results provide  some, but not overwhelming,  support for the comion  perception 
that older taxpayers are more  compliant  than  younger ones  (see  Jackson  and 
Milliron,  1986).  For two audit classes  (low and Riddle  income proprietors)  we 
find a significant and positive  relationship  between reported tax liability  and 
average  age.  For middle  income proprietors we also  find  significantly  higher 
reported  income and tax liability  in  areas with  a relatively  high  percent of 
the population  over  65.  For low income proprietors  the relationship  is 
reversed.  We believe  that  the finding for the low income audit class  is a 
result  of  the regressive  structure  of the tax code benefits afforded 
individuals over 65.  At low income  levels  the tax code effects outweigh  anr 
additional  compliance  behavior  of older  individuals  whereas at higher  income 
levels  the compliance  effect  is predominant. 
The remaining  three  variables  were  included to  control  for exclusions, 
adjustment  and other  subtractions  from  income allowed  by  the tax code.  When 
significant  the results for average  family size and percent of housing owner 
occupied  are am  anticipated:  negative and significant  in the tax liability 
equation  reflecting  the exemptions  for children  and the deductions  for mortgage 
interest payments  and property  taxes. 
The findings  for the unemployment  variable  do not seem  to  reflect the 
exclusions  of unemployment  compensation  from income reporting.  Indeed,  the 
coefficients  on the unemployment  rate  are generally positive  in the reported 
AOl equation  and significantly  positive  for two of the low income  groups.  It 21 
may be that  Income  reporting  increases  with  the unemployment  rate because of 
Increased  filings associated  with  attempts  to secure tax refunds. 
The coefficients  on  the unemployment  rate  are consistently  negative In 
the tax liability  equation,  but are only  significant  for low Income 
proprietors.  Our results suggest that  unemployment  has only  a  very weak 
association  with  compliance  and any tendency  for areas with  high  rates of 
unemployment  to have lower levels of compliance  stems  from overstatements  of 
subtractions  not understatements  of income.  Thus.  It does  not appear  that  the 
effect  of unemployment  can be  explained  by  operation  in the underground 
economy.  The effects  may be  due to antigovernment  attitudes  or to a simple 
attempt  to overcome  financial  stress by obtaining  a bigger tax refund. 
However,  the effects  are not strong. 
Studies  that  use an  estimated  compliance  rate based on  auditor  findings 
as the dependent  variable  for compliance  equations  (Witte and  Woodbury,  1985 
and Dubin  and Wilde.  1988) generally  find  increased  unemployment  to be 
associated  with decreased  compliance.  We suspect that these results may 
reflect  In large  part the auditors'  ability  to detect overstated  deductions. 
As noted earlier,  our results for the audit equation  although 
significant  are not very  strong.  See Table  4.  We find the probability of an 
audit  to be  significantly  associated  with information  available  on taxpayers' 
returns  for all audit  classes.  That Is, we find  no  support for the IRS 
pursuing  a random  audit  strategy.ior any audit  class.  or  four of the five 
audit classes  we consider,  auditing  is significantly  associated with the 
endogenous  taxpayers'  reports  (i.e., by reported  AGI and total tax liability). 
For the remaining  audit  class  (siddle income wage and salary  workers)  the 
probability  of  audit  is  not signicantly  affected  by  the endogenous  taxpayer 22 
reports but is significantly  affected by  variables  that are related  to 
information  available  on  taxpayers'  returns.19  Specifically  for middle  income 
wage  and salary  workers  we find  that  the probability of audit  is higher in 
areas where  a larger percentage p1 individuals is employed  in services  and 
other nonanufacturing jobs and where there  is a higher  percentage  of  the 
population  over  65.  We  suspect  that  these variables  are proxying  specific 
aspects of taxpayers'  reports that  we do not observe although  they might be 
mirroring  IRS targeting  of specific professions  or income sources. 
6.  Reduced Form  Results 
Economic studies  of  taxpayer  compliance  have focused on audits  as  the 
enforcement  activity of the IRS.  This is perhaps as natural choice  given  the 
theoretical and empirical  models for  participation  in  other  illegal activities 
and the IRS's emphasis  on the importance of audits.  As reported  in the 
previous  section,  however,  both our work  and the previous  literature  find 
relatively  weak  deterrent  effects  from audits.  Admittedly,  this empirical  work 
is based on  aggregate  data  and given  the relatively  low audit coverage  this is 
a potential  problem.  In  addition,  the emphasis  on  audits may be misplaced. 
The IRS undertakes  many  other enorcement and service activities  such as 
matching  the income claims on  the return against  1099 and  W-2 documents. 
checking  math  errors, providing  information  and education programs,  pursuing 
delinquent  accounts,  instituting  detailed  investigations  and recommending 
civil and criminal  cases  against tax evaders.  The reduced form  estimates  for 
reported  AOl and tax liability reveal  that these other  activities  may also  have 
significant  compliance  effects. 23 
While  estimates  of the sjuctural equations  suggest that  compliance 
behavior varies  markedly  across taxpayer  groups and that  audits  have  limited 
deterrence  effects,  the reduced from  equations  reveal a consistent  pattern of 
compliance  behavior  and show significant  effects of IRS activities.  Consider 
the reduced form  results  for reported  tax liability  reported  in  Table  5.  These 
results  Indicate  that  Increases  In IRS work  load (returns per full—time 
—equivalent  employee)  consistently  and significantly  decrease reported  tax 
liability.20 This  result  when  coupled with our much  weaker  structural 
findings  regarding  the effects of audits  suggests that IRS activities  other 
than audits may  have significant  impacts on  compliance. 
The reduced  form  results for the sociodemographic  and tax code  related 
variables  also are also far more  significant  and consistent  than in the 
structural  model.21  This  suggests  that the variability  of the structural 
results across  taxpayer  classes may be due at least in part  to the fact that 
IRS activities  other  than  audits  affect  compliance  and perhaps that academic 
researchers  have  not been  very  s!pcessful  in  modeling  the audit process. 
7.  Conclusions 
At this  point  it  seems worthwhile  to step  back  and consider what  we  can 
conclude  regarding  compliance  behavior  not only from  the work reported here  but 
also from  other  work  that  has used  data related to 1969 tax returns  (e.g.. 
Clotfelter,  1983. Witte and Woodbury,  1985, Oubln  and Wilde,  1988).  There are 
two important  reasons for giving  thought to what  has been learned In the course 
of this work.  First,  there are now a number  of  studies  that use data  related 
to 1969 returns  and there  is some  controversy  surrounding  the reported results. 
Second,  the 1969 data sets contain  information that is only available  through 24 
the IRS and the recent  work  represents  the first time  that  personnel  outside 
the IRS have  been  allowed  to  analyze such  data and publish  results.  It  is 
important that  we learn as much  as  possible  from  the 1969 results because the 
IRS is now  making  more recent data  available  and a number  of researchers  are 
developing  proposals  based on the new  data  sets. 
All authors who consider the issue  (Witte and  Woodbury,  1985, Dubin and 
Wilde, 1988  and the results reported here) conclude  that for most  audit  classes 
audits have  positive  effects on  compliance  but that  the magnitudes  of  the 
effects are small.  Further,  different  models suggest  that  audits  deter 
noncompliance  for different  groups.  Wltte and  Woodbury  find  deterrent effects 
(mainly lagged effects)  for all audit classes except  the low incoe  class  that 
takes standard  deductions.  Dubin and  Wilde  find  a deterrent  effect  for four of 
the seven audit  classes and  a significant deterrent  effect  for low income wage 
and salary  workers who take  standard  and who take itemized  deductions.  (For 
high  income wage  and salary  workers they  find  that  a higher  probability of 
being  audited  is associated  with  less compliance.)  We find  a deterrent  effect 
of audits  for the five low and middle  income  audit classes  that we consider and 
a significant  effect  for low income returns with  standard  deductions  and for 
low and middle  income proprietors.  Obviously  the results depend  critically  on 
model  specification.  This is quite worrisome  and suggests  that economists' 
understanding  of the effects of audits on  tai compliance  is not very thorough. 
For some audit classes, part  of  the problem may be that there  Is very 
little noncompliance  to explain.  None  of  the empirical  studies have found a 
deterrent  effect  of  audits  for middle  income wage and salary workers who were 
the most  compliant  audit class  in 1969.  Interestingly,  the audit class  for 
which our model  provides  the best  the description  of  compliance  behavior  is 25 
also the least compliant  audit class, namely  low income proprietors. 
Given  the attention  that has been focused on  how audit coverage 
affects  tax compliance, it is rather disappointing  that empirical  researchers 
have not made  more progress.  We believe  that  the major reasons for the state 
of affairs  relate to the nature of the data  utilized and the secrecy 
surrounding  the IRS's audit  selection  formulas.  All studies that have 
considered  the effect of audits  on compliance  have  used  data  that Is  aggregated 
to at least the three digit zip code  level.  The use of such data  to estimate 
the audit  selection  rule is potentially  a severe problem.  With audit coverage 
in the range of one to five  percent,  the audit selection  system  Is primarily  an 
"outliers'  system.  To be more specific,  the IRS's DIP formulas are primarily 
selecting  returns for audit that  are outliers  In terms of reporting  behavior. 
The averaging  implicit in  aggregate  data  washes  out most information on 
outliers  and, hence, may only very  poorly  reflect  the audit selection  rule. 
In order to maintain  the integrity  of its audit selection  system, the 
IRS must  release  data  in a form that  precludes  academic researchers motivated 
by intellectual  curiosity or private greed  from estimating  an audit selection 
rule  that closely duplicates  the IRS's formulas.  This  means that  researchers 
may have  great  difficulty  estimating  meaningful  structural equations  with 
audits.  Indeed,  one can question the ethics of  doing so.  Yet, as  noted 
earlier,  different  types of  audit rules  have  quite  different Implications  for 
the specification  of  compliance  equations.  This is obviously a  major  issue 
that the IRS and compliance  researchers  need  to  consider very  carefully. 
An  additional  reason  why empirical  studies may  not have  found 
consistently  significant  deterrent  effects  is that the economic  research  thus 
far has concentrated  on  the effects of only  one IRS enforcement  activity, 26 
namely  audits.  Other enforcement  and service activities  of the IRS (e.g., 
taxpayer services  and document matching  for W—2 and 1099 forms)  may also have 
significant  compliance  effects.  Part of  the reason  why the reduced form  model 
shows  a more consistent  deterrent  effect  than do the structural  models  for 
audits  may be related to how other  IRS activities  affect compliance.  Very 
little  is known  about the  effects  of IRS enforcement  efforts other  than  audits 
or  about  the effects of  service activities.  Some  work  has been  done though on 
how programs  directed  at return preparers  might affect  reporting behavior 
(Scholz, Roth,  and  Witte,  1988). 
While  results from  the 1969  data  sets allow no  definitive  conclusions 
regarding  the effects of  audits on  compliance,  they provide very  valuable  and 
quite consistent  guidance regarding  the type of sociodemographic  variables  to 
include to control for"tastes  and  preferences".  This  is  quite  important since 
theory  provides  little direction  in this  area.  Specifically,  the results from 
the study  of  the 1969 data  base  indicate  that the age, sex, and race  of  the 
taxpayer,  the taxpayer's  education,  and taxpayer's  country of  birth affect 
compliance.  The results of work  with the 1969 data  base also  suggest  that it 
is important  to  consider the specifics of the tax code when  constructing  and 
interpreting  the coefficients  on  sociodemographic  variables.  Variables  such  as 
the age of the taxpayer may  be related  both  to attitudes  towards compliance  and 
to the special allowances  in the tax code for older  individuals. 
Careful  comparison of existing work also  indicates that  when 
interpreting  the coefficients  of  compliance  models it is  important  to consider 
the model  specification  very  carefully.  The results one obtains  appear to be 
quite  sensitive  to  the dependent  variable  utilized and the vector of 
explanatory  variables  included.  All previous  research that  has used 1969 data 27 
bases  has estimated  a single compliance  equation with  a dependent  variable 
which  is either  directly  (Clotfelter.  1983) or  indirectly  (Witte  and Woodbury, 
1985, and Dubin  and Wilde.  1988) linked to  auditors'  findings.22  The results 
of this research  needs to be interpreted  with care because coefficients reflect 
auditors'  as well as  taxpayers'  behavior.  For example,  our results suggest 
that  previous  findings  (Witte and Woodbury,  1985; Dubin  and  Wilde,  1988) that 
increased  unemployment  is  generally  associated  with  decreased  compliance may 
be due to tax auditors'  abilities  to  uncover  overstated  deductions. 
In addition,  the seemingly mixed  evidence regarding  the relationship 
between  education  and compliance  results from  differences  is the explanatory 
factors  included  in the models and is quite  understandable  when  one considers 
the specifications  of the models.  If income  is included in  the model,  then we 
find that the more educated are less compliant.  If.  however,  the specification 
of the compliance  equation  does not include a measure of income, then  the 
educated  may appear  to be more  compliant  (e.g.. Dubln and  Wilde,  1988). 
Without an income variable  in  the model,  however,  the education  variable 
reflects  the change in  compliance  associated  jointly with an  increase  in 
education  and the average change  in income that  accompanies  the increased 
education. 28 
Endnotes 
1Xlepper  and Nagin  (1987) use the 1982 TCMP  data  to  examine how factors 
related  to individual  line items on the return  affect compliance. 
2Adjustments  have, of course, been  subtracted  from  income  to obtain 
AGI.  Thus,  when  considering  results for our AOL equation  some subtractions 
will be included.  However,  adjustments  to income  in 1969 were  very small  (less 
than  $700  thousand  or less than .1 percent of  reported AOl) and,  thus, our 
results  should  not be affected  much  by  adjustments.  Reported  AGI reflects 
mainly  the income reporting  decision.  Our data  contain no  measures of income 
before  adjustments. 
3See  Witte and  Woodbury  (1983b), Kinsey  (1984b), Tauchen and Witte 
(1986), and Scholz, Roth  and Witte  (1988) for surveys. 
4See,  for exampl&, Controller  General of the United  States  (1976), 
Weddick  (1983), or wilt (1986). 
5See  Tauchen and Witte  (1986b) for additional  details regarding  the 
audit  selection  process. 
6We obtained  some Census  information from  the Project 778 files and 
other  variables  directly  from the Census  tapes. 
7See  Witte  and Woodbury  (1983a, 1985) or Dubin  and Wilde  (1988) for 
additional  description  of  the Project 778 data. 
8For example, Census  data contains only  open—ended  income categories 
for high income  individuals. 
9Note  that if  the taxpayer report  affects the probability  of  audit  that 
it is the parameters  on  these variables  not the simple  probability of audit 
that  will affect  taxpayer  compliance.  We consider the approach taken  in this 
paper  a first approximation  to properly modeling  of  compliance  behavior when 
the taxpayer's  reports affect  the probability of an audit.  See Tauchen and 
Witte  (1986a and 1986b)  for a discussion  of a way to  model  compliance when the 
audit  rule depends on  taxpayer  behavior. 
101n 1969, seventy percent of  all returns audited resulted in  auditors' 
findings  that  adjustments were necessary.  See Commissioner  of Internal Revenue 
(1970). 
For  example,  in 1969 when  two and a half  million returns were 
audited,  only  25,110 were received by the appelate division  and 2,293 were 
received  for full—scale  criminal investigation. 
12  Civil  penalties are a set rate  on  the amount of taxes the auditor 
estimates  to have been underpaid.  Thus, detectability  is central to  tax 
penalties  when  civil penalties  are imposed as well.  Only  criminal penalties 
are not directly  related  to the auditors'  estimates  of  the amount of 
underpayment.  There were  only  526 criminal convictions  for tax fraud  in 1969. 29 
Criminal  tax cases generally  relate to such IRS special  programs as the 
organized  crime and drug  enforcement programs  or to notorious cases  of evasion 
such  as the recent case  against the Reverend  Moon. 
13There was information reporting  on  dividend  and interest income  in 
1969,  but the IRS had not perfected  its matching  programs  and, hence, did not 
make very  effective  use of this type  of paper  trail  information. 
14me IRS estimates  that auditors  are able to  uncover only  $1 In  every 
$3 that Is reported  on 1099 documents  (US Department  of  the Treasury,  1983). 
Until  1979  the TCMP  auditors were not provided  with 1099 forms. 
15We developed  a marginal tax rate variable  that reflected  differences 
in state  tax codes and differences  in subtractions  related to  differences  in 
costs of living  and other factors.  Perhaps  because of the aggregate  nature of 
our data,  the marginal  tax  variable was essentially  an income proxy. 
16See Reinganua  and  Wilde  (1985) or  Tauchen and Wltte  (1986a). 
170ur count  of  the number of  IRS full—time—equivalent  employees 
excludes  those  at  the regional service centers since  they  do  not conduct audits 
and the district  employees  who handle alcohol,  tobacco  and firearms 
enforcement. 
18gemember  that  these employment  structure  variables are also included 
to control  for legal subtractions  from income.  We would expect  individuals in 
the service  industries  to  have higher  levels  of employee  business expenses and 
contributions  to self employment pension  plans,  These  adjustments would  lead 
to negative  coefficients  on the percent employed  in  services in  the reported 
AGI equation.  However, the effect  should  not be very  large since  total 
adjustments  were only .1 percent of  AGI in 1969. 
19The  reduced  form results for the reported  AGI equation  are also 
available  upon request.  As for the structural  equations,  the reduced form 
results  show  that the IRS activities have a greater effect  upon reported 
subtractions  than  on  reported  income. 
20A5  in the structural  model, we believe that  the significant  and 
negative  coefficients  on the variables  of the percent of the population over  85 
for the low income  classes result  from the nature  of the Income exclusions  and 
exemptions  allowance  given  to older  taxpayers.  At low income  levels, these tax 
code  effects  swamp  the compliance  effects associated  with  age. 
21The  dependent  variable  used  by Witte  and Woodbury  (1985a) and Dubin 
and Wilde  (1988)  particularly  troublesome.  The measure of  compliance  is 
created  from the DIF scores.  Results using  this  dependent  will reflect the DIF 
formulas  as well  as taxpayer and auditor behavior. 30 
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Acronymn  Definitions  of Audit  Class 
LI-SD  Low—income  tax returns taking  the standard deduction 
(AGI < $10,000 with  no Schedule C or  F) 
LI-ID  Low-income  tax returns  taking Itemized  deductions 
(AGI < $10,000 with  no Schedule C or  F) 
LI-C&F  Low—income  propreitor  tax returns 
(AGI below  $10,000 with Schedule C or  F) 
M1—W&S  Midd1e-incoe wage  and salary workers 
(AGI between $10,000 and $50,000 with  no  Schedule C or  F) 
MI—C&F  Middle—income  propreitor  tax returns 
(AGI between $10,000  and $30,000 with  Schedule C or  F) Table  2: Empirical  Results for Reported Adjusted  Gross  Income: 2SLS 
(t—values in parentheses) 
Audit Class 
Variable  LI-SD  LI—ID  LI—C&F  MI-W&S  MI-C&F 
Log odds  of an  audit  —-  648.13  1693.37  450.75  2491.81  1072.27 
endogenous  (2.87)  (1.05)  (3.20)  (0.72)  (1.07) 
Income  .27  .43  .60  .97  .90 
(6.47)  (4.96)  (14.46)  (8.72)  (15.78) 
Detectability: 
S Employed  in  8.77  —.34  2.67  15.18  4.00 
manufacturing  (3.52)  (—0.10)  (2.21)  (0.67)  (0.74) 
S Employed  in Services  6.30  —20.37  —8.23  —8,87  11.42 
(1.55)  (-1.40)  (—2.84)  (—0,26)  (0.65) 
Sociodemographics: 
S High School  3.52  2.91  —8.38  —15.89  —22,23 
Education  (.90)  (0.42)  (-5.05)  (—2.71)  (—3.11) 
S Nonwhite  .11  —.97  .42  5.13  1.71 
(.11)  (—0.40)  (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.35) 
S Female—headed  —29.52  —20.83  25.98  60.09  52.45 
Households  (—1.90)  (—1.05)  (4.76)  (2.12)  (2.17) 
S  Foreign  Born  11.87  10.52  —7.24  —52.80  —49.04 
(2.70)  (0.55)  (—2.48)  (—1.79)  (—2.67) 
Average  Age  —6.80  —70.51  —6.68  23.20  26.12 
(—.50)  (—0.88)  (—0.78)  (0.53)  (0.70) 
Tax Code  Variables: 
S Over  65  14.63  65.70  —13.58  35.69  56.51 
Years  (1.24)  (0.93)  (—2.46)  (1.29)  (2.51) 
Average Family  39.95  278.49  —70.99  —274.90  —389.80 
Size  (.44)  (0.96)  (—1.40)  (—1.05)  (—1.58) 
S Housing  Owner  1.55  .30  2.44  —3.51  1.61 
Occupied  (.76)  (0.08)  (1.55)  (—0.37)  (0.23) 
S Unemployed  39.04  67.97  13.55  —36.47  18.00 
(3.32)  (3.10)  (1.41)  (—0.77)  (0.39) 
Constant  4442.44  12238.68  3958.82  7785.44  3319.67 
(4.25)  (1.59)  (3.72)  (0.58)  (0.72) 
R2  .42  .14  .79  .52  .58 
F  47.30  10.26  248.66  66.96  83.74 
N  858  852  858  827  801 Table  3: Empirical Results  for Reported  Total Tax Liability:  2SLS 
(t—values in  parentheses) 
Audit Class 
Variable  LI-SD  LI-ID  LI—C&F  MI-W&S  MI-C&F 
Log odds of an  audit ——  109.60  290.17  71.50  2035.37  648.83 
endogenous  (2.66)  (1.04)  (3.21)  (0.89)  (1.72) 
Income  0.07  0.10  0.09  0.27  0.22 
(9.17)  (6.38)  (14.42)  (3.68)  (10.01) 
Detectability: 
% Employed  in  1.42  0.65  0.32  12.77  0.49 
manufacturing  (3.14)  (0.11)  (1.66)  (0.86)  (0.24) 
Employed  in  Services  .46  -4.15  -2.03  —16.77  -3.90 
(0.62)  (—1.65)  (—4.43)  (—0.76)  (—0.59) 
Soc  iodemographics: 
% High  School  0.61  0.23  —1.45  —7.87  —10.15 
Education  (0.85)  (0.19)  (—5.53)  (-2.04)  (3.78) 
% Nonwhite  —0.31  —0.53  —0.36  2.43  —1.59 
(—1.66)  (—1.27)  (—2.61)  (0.33)  (—0.88) 
% Female—headed  —4.81  —3.66  2.49  16.33  14.22 
Households  (-1.69)  (-1.06)  (2.89)  (0.88)  (1.57) 
% Foreign  Born  1.75  1.92  —1.48  —30.73  -24.65 
(2.19)  (0.58)  (—3.20)  (1.59)  (—3.58) 
Average  Age  2.89  —4.79  3.96  20.96  24.95 
(1.16)  (—0.35)  (2.94)  (0.73)  (1.78) 
Tax Code  Variables: 
% Over  65  1.78  10.74  —2.35  4.26  14.21 
Years  (0.82)  (0.88)  (—2.68)  (0.24)  (1.68) 
Average Family  —11.02  5.07  -35.74  -256.13  —280.03 
Size  (—0.67)  (0.10)  (—4.44)  (—1.49)  (—3.02) 
% Housing  Owner  -.32  -1.06  -.32  -5.82  -.63 
Occupied  (—0.85)  (—1.67)  (—1.26)  (—0.94)  (—0.24) 
% Unemployed  —0.12  —1.78  —5.38  —46.40  -16.92 
(—0.05)  (—0.47)  (—3.54)  (—1.49)  (—0.99) 
Constant  381.16  1449.62  257.94  5966.08  1270.73 
(1.99)  (1.09)  (1.53)  (0.68)  (0.73) 
R2  .56  .22  .78  .13  .35 
F  81.77  18.50  231.84  9.34  33.03 
N  858  852  858  827  801 Table  4:  Empirical Results for the Log Odds  of An  Audit  (x  1000):  2SLS 
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17.71  6.51  42.26  13.65  8.52 
858  852  858  827  801 Table  5:  Empirical  Results  for Reported  Total  Tax Liability:  Reduced Form 
(t—values  in  parentheses> 
Audit Class 
Variable  LI-SD  LI-ID  LI-C&F  MI-W&S  MI—C&F 
Returns  per FTE  -9.16  —7.13  -8.24  —47.37  -45.83 
(bOOs)  (-4.74)  (—3.07)  (—4.58)  (—2.71)  (—2.53) 
Income  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.21  0.19 
(26.31)  (22.37)  (37.67)  (19.26)  (16.64) 
Detectability: 
% Employed  in  0.50  -0.19  0.27  0.33  2.25 
manufacturing  (3.51)  (—1.08)  (2.08)  (.28)  (1.78) 
Employed  in  Services  -1.14  —1.70  —.99  2.06  5,53 
(—4.65)  (—5.60)  (—4.33)  (0.90)  (2.26) 
Sociodemographics: 
High  School  —1.19  -0.92  —0.88  —6.38  —6.61 
Education  (-8.23)  (-5.31)  (—6.60)  (—5.48)  (-5.37) 
Nonwhite  -0.21  —0.32  —0.31  -3.47  -2.73 
(—2.08)  (—2.54)  (—3.29)  (—3.42)  (—2.42) 
% Female-headed  2.43  -.60  4.10  26.35  22.19 
Households  (4.42)  (-0.89)  (8.00)  (5.20)  (4.04) 
% Foreign  Born  0.15  —1.40  —2.07  -16.25  -16.72 
(0.45)  (—3.50)  (—6.68)  (—5.18)  (—5.08)- 
Average  Age  7.11  8.70  4.96  30.57  31.02 
(7.45)  (7.59)  (5.58)  (3.64)  (3.45) 
Tax Code  Variables: 
Over 65  -2.81  -1.48  —2.88  12.83  13.55 
Years  (—4.44)  (—1.95)  (—488)  (2.40)  (2.37) 
Average  Family  —46.46  —43.22  —21.96  -169.48  —183.14 
Size  (—8.89  (—6.87)  (—4.51)  (—3.59)  (—3.62) 
% Housthg  Owner  -.76  -.86  -.53  -1.86  -1.93 
Occupied  (-'4.29)  (—4.05)  (—3.21)  (—1.18)  (—1.16) 
%  Unemployed  —3.04  —2.64  —3.53  —37.28  -34.08 
(-2.90)  (-2.09)  (-3.61)  (-3.93)  (—3.45) 
Constant  —80.23  85.03  —243.22  —1655.81  —1477.21 
(2.84)  (2.49)  (9.24)  (—6.10)  (—5.25) 
R2  .80  .71  .88  .57  .53 
F  259.74  160.68  470.63  85.97  71.46 
N  857  851  857  826  800 